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Abstract
We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We nd that equi-
libria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being
double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very prot-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with
double-dipping, borrowers who double-dip are actually worse o compared to those who do not.
Further, for intermediate levels of motivation, there can be multiple equilibria, with a double-
dipping equilibrium co-existing with a no default equilibrium. Interestingly, an increase in MFI
competition can lower eciency, as well as increase the extent of double-dipping and default.
Further, the interest rates may go either way, with the interest rate likely to increase if the MFIs
are very motivated.
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1 Introduction
One of the salient features of the micro-nance movement is its rapid expansion. In India, for
example, the average year-on-year increase in the portfolio of the Indian micro-nance sector over
the period 2004-2009 was 107% (as compared to a 4% increase in commercial bank lending in
2008-09, see Parameshwar et al., 2009). Other countries also witnessed similar expansions.1 With
increased micro-nance penetration, there has been a concomitant increase in competition among
micro-nance institutions, with many areas being served by multiple MFIs.
One of the central issues in this context, and the one we focus on in this paper, is that of
`double-dipping', i.e. borrowers taking loans from several MFIs, and the closely connected issue of
borrower default. Several studies conrm the importance of double-dipping, and also nd evidence
to suggest that double-dipping may be be linked to the phenomenon of borrower default.
In the South Indian state of Karnataka, for example, there were 7.31 million micro-nance
accounts by the end of 2009 (Srinivasan, 2009). Even assuming that all the poor were covered, this
comes to 2.63 accounts per household.2 In the Indian context, Srinivasan (2009) further argues that
borrowers often use loans from one MFI to repay other MFIs.3 In the context of Bangladesh, the
Wall Street Journal (27.11.2001) reports that \Surveys have estimated that 23% to 43% of families
borrowing from micro-lenders in Tangail borrow from more than one."4;5 For Bangladesh, McIntosh
and Wydick (2005) nd that in spite of the fact that competitive pressures among microlenders
reduced interest rates for some borrowers, 32% of the Grameen Bank's loan portfolio in Tangail
was overdue by 2 years or more.
The eect of an increase in MFI competition, and the resultant double-dipping, is not very clear-
cut theoretically, especially in so far as the the eciency and welfare implications are concerned. It
is of course clear that such double-dipping can weaken borrower discipline and increase default (see
Ho and Stiglitz, 1997). Others have argued however that competition, by reducing interest rates,
1Between 1997 and 2005, the estimated number of micronance institutions (MFIs) worldwide grew from 618
to 3133 (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Data from the MIX (Micronance Information Exchange) indicates that the
number of Indian MFIs reporting data shot up from 11 in 2000, to 144 in 2011. The corresponding numbers are
7 in 2000, and 73 in 2011 for Bangladesh, while those for Indonesia are 2 in 2000, and 60 in 2011. These gures
admittedly do not cover non-reporting MFIs though.
2The number would be higher if one takes into account that the loans generally go to women, and that the very
poor are typically not covered (Srinivasan, 2009). In fact such increased MFI competition is happening all across
India, including the Northern and Eastern states, and not just in the Southern states (which traditionally lead in
micro-nance development) (Srinivasan, 2009).
3A survey by the Grameen Koota sta covering 200 borrowers (including 105 defaulters), suggests that 25 per
cent of these borrowers had taken loans from 6 or more MFIs. In another extreme example, one woman was found
to have borrowed Rs. 4 million from dierent MFIs (Srinivasan, 2009).
4The same Wall Street Journal report claims that villagers in Tangail district could quote rates from as many as
7 competing microlenders from memory.
5McIntosh and Wydick (2005) provide evidence of increased MFI competition from Uganda and Kenya in East
Africa, and Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua in Central America.
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may improve borrower welfare.6 As we shall argue later, this paper provides a partial reconciliation
of these divergent viewpoints.
In this paper we seek to develop a tractable model of MFI competition that incorporates two
facts, rst, that money is fungible, thus allowing for double-dipping,7 and, second, that the MFIs
are motivated, i.e. not only interested in their own prots, but also in the utility of the borrowers.
That many NGOs (including MFIs) are motivated is well known in the literature. The United
Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacic (1992)
(henceforth UNICIRDAP) for example, denes NGOs as organizations with six key features: they
are voluntary, non-prot, service and development oriented, autonomous, highly motivated and
committed, and operate under some form of formal registration.8
Formally we adopt a variation of the Salop circular city model populated by borrowers, as well
as motivated MFIs, where the distance between an MFI and a borrower captures the transactions
cost incurred by the borrower in accessing a loan from the concerned MFI. We consider a framework
with both moral hazard, as well as asymmetric information. With money being fungible, there is
a moral hazard problem in case of multiple lending since the MFIs cannot ascertain whether, in
addition to investing, which is ecient, the borrowers are also spending on consumption, which is
not. The asymmetric information arises out of the fact that the MFIs are unaware of the transaction
costs of borrowing facing the dierent borrowers, and hence cannot oer loan contracts which are
tailored to the needs of the individual borrowers.
We show that the implications of an increase in MFI competition are quite nuanced, with
regard to both eciency, as well as borrower welfare. Consider equilibria with double-dipping
(henceforth DDE). We nd that an increase in MFI competition, while reducing the transactions
cost of borrowing, which is eciency enhancing, necessarily leads to an increase in default, both at
the aggregate level, as well as in default per MFI. Interestingly, the increase in default in fact follows
because of the rst eect, i.e. a reduction in transactions costs. While a reduction in transactions
costs makes all loans more attractive, double-dipping becomes relatively more so as multiple loans
are involved. This increases double-dipping and, consequently default, and also leads to ineciency
since consumption increases.
6As an example of the former stance, consider the following quote: \with the development of active competition be-
tween MFIs there has been a deluge of loan funds available to borrowers which has fueled excessive borrowing....Finally
it is believed that in consequence of over-borrowing, default rates have been climbing in some locations but these have
not been disclosed because of ever-greening and multiple lending" (page 16, Malegam Committee Report, 2011). As
an example of the second stance, consider the quote \to reduce interest rates charged by MFIs or improve the service
provided to borrowers....Ultimately, this can only be done through greater competition both within the MFIs and
without from other agencies operating in the micronance sector." (page 32, Malegam Committee Report, 2011).
7It is acknowledged by policy makers that it is dicult for MFIs to assess their borrowers' total liabilities, i.e.
whether they are borrowing from other sources or not (Srinivasan, 2009). Similarly, Janvry et al. (2011) also nd,
using Guatamelan data, that borrowers did not disclose past defaults or total liabilities to lenders on their own.
8See Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006), and Ghatak and Mueller (2011) for studies on incentive provision to
motivated agents.
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Second, turning to the eect of increased competition on the interest rate, there are two opposing
eects at play. First, because of increased competition, the rate of interest should be lower, as
the business-stealing eect gets stronger with an increase in competition. Second, with increased
competition leading to an increase in default (as argued earlier), there is an increase in the negative
externality that borrowers exert on the MFIs, leading to an increase in the interest rate.9 Our
analysis shows that that the second eect dominates when the MFIs are highly motivated. This
follows since, with suciently motivated MFIs, the interest rate is going to be low to begin with,
so that the MFIs will be just breaking even, and the business-stealing eect is kept in check by
feasibility considerations. With an increase in competition, the second eect therefore comes into
play. As argued earlier, with an increase in competition double-dipping increases, so that the MFIs
are forced to increase their interest rates so as to break even.
Given the preceding results regarding the impact of increased MFI competition on interest rates,
it is therefore intriguing that the empirical evidence also appears to be mixed. For example, Por-
teous (2006) and Fernando (2006) provide evidence of a decrease in MFI interest rates in response
to increased MFI competition (over the 1990s in Bolivia in Porteus (2006), and over 2003-2006 in
Cambodia for Fernando (2006)). On the other hand, there is scant evidence that interest rates fell
in response to MFI competition for Bangladesh, or Uganda (Porteous, 2006).
Turning to the welfare implications, we nd that the utility of the double-dipping borrowers
necessarily increases. This is of interest given that there are several eects at play here. While the
double-dipping borrowers gain because of a reduction in transactions costs, the interest rates may,
as argued earlier, also go up (at least in some cases). With double-dipping borrowers necessarily
defaulting however, all their veriable income is taken up in loan repayments and any further
variations in interest rates do not aect their payo. Thus, for the double-dippers, the rst eect
dominates. The single-dipping borrowers however may be adversely aected in case competition
leads to an increase in the rate of interest. In addition, some of them may be worse o because of
the new loan conguration which may not suit their needs.
Thus our analysis provides a partial reconciliation of the two conicting viewpoints on MFI
competition. Given the plausible assumption that increased competition lowers transactions costs
for borrowers, we however nd that this apparently positive aect can have negative implications,
in that there will be increased double-dipping, with resultant loss in eciency. At the same time
however, the utility of all double-dipping borrowers will increase. The impact on the utility of the
single-dipping borrowers is, however, ambiguous.
We then briey discuss some properties of a double-dipping equilibria, i.e. DDE. First, contrary
to popular perceptions, we nd that borrowers who double-dip are actually worse o compared to
those who do not. This is because borrowers who double-dip do so as their transactions costs
9The negative externality exerted by agents in the presence of non-exclusive contracts has been examined in the
literature, viz. Kahn and Mookherjee (1995, 1998). We relate the present paper to this literature in somewhat greater
details later on.
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are relatively large, so that their net utility, post-default, will be relatively small after taking the
transaction costs into account, and even lower than that of those who take a single loan. Second,
we demonstrate that a DDE exists whenever the MFIs are not too motivated. Intuitively, the MFIs
are likely to charge higher interest rates when they are relatively more prot-oriented. This reduces
the payo from single-dipping, whereas that from double-dipping is not aected at all. This makes
double-dipping relatively attractive, at least for those borrowers who are not too close to any one
MFI.
Finally, we nd that multiple equilibria, with both DDE and single-dipping equilibrium (in
which no borrower double-dips, henceforth SDE), exist whenever the MFIs are neither too moti-
vated, nor too prot-oriented, and, moreover, project productivity is relatively high. The feedback
loop sustaining multiple equilibria can be traced to the fact that MFIs care both about their own
prot - which is increasing in interest rates - and about borrower welfare - which is decreasing in
interest rates. Consequently, while a high equilibrium interest rate can lead to high MFI utility,
because of the prot eect, so can a low interest rate, because of the motivation eect. Thus, with
the MFIs being not too motivated, one can sustain a double-dipping equilibrium with a relatively
high interest rate, so that some borrowers double dip. At the same time, high project productiv-
ity and the fact that MFIs are not too prot-oriented can generate an SDE with a relatively low
interest rate, so that borrowers have an incentive to borrow from a single source and repay.
1.1 Related Literature
We start with a brief review of the empirical literature on MFI competition, double-dipping, and
default. McIntosh et al. (2005) nd evidence for double-dipping using Ugandan data, showing that
multiple lending increases and repayment worsens with an increase in the number of competing
MFIs. Similarly, Vogelgesang (2003) nds multiple loan-taking to be an important trigger in
borrower defaults in Bolivia and also to result in low borrower repayment. While 13% of the
borrowers of the Bolivian micronancier Caja Los Andes took loans from other sources in 1996,
this proportion increased to 24% in 2000. Vogelgesang (2003) also nds that some clients had to
pay high interest rates, which encouraged default. In the Bolivian context, Marconi and Mosley
(2005) nd that the rapid increase in micronance competition in Bolivia played a role in worsening
the micronance loan portfolio, with over-indebtedness aecting 15-17% of the portfolio of leading
MFIs.
Thus our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical evidence which seem to suggest,
broadly speaking, that MFI competition may increase multiple lending, as well as default.10 Fur-
ther, as discussed earlier, we nd that the results in the present paper consistent with the fact
10While McIntosh et al. (2005) indicates that the Ugandan micronance market was unsaturated prior to the rise
in competition, in our framework all borrowers approach at least one MFI, though they may incur potentially heavy
transaction costs in the process.
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that an increase in MFI competition may, or may not lead to an increase in the rate of interest
(Porteous, 2006, and Fernando, 2006).
We now briey relate our paper to the small, though growing theoretical literature on MFI
competition. As mentioned earlier, the issue of multiple lending is related to a broader literature
on non-exclusive contracts, viz. Kahn and Mookherjee (1995, 1998), where the central theme is that
such contracts impose an externality on the other agents. In the present paper, for example, we nd
that whenever multiple equilibria exist the interest rate is higher under a DDE. This follows since
the fact that some of the borrowers default means that the MFIs will have to recoup their losses
on the other borrowers, thus pushing up interest rates for all borrowers, which can be interpreted
as an externality on these borrowers.
Further, the specic MFI context allows for more structure on the problem, generating some
additional results of interest. For example, several of the results hinge on the fact that MFIs are
motivated. For one, multiple equilibria cannot emerge unless the MFIs are relatively motivated.
For another, the result that under a double-dipping equilibrium an increase in competition can lead
to an increase in interest rates, also emerges only when the MFIs are motivated. These results will
not arise therefore, in a model that deals with lenders in general, who are unlikely to be motivated.
The theoretical literature on MFI competition includes, among others, Ho and Stiglitz (1987),
Kranton and Swamy (1999), Tassel (2002), Navajas et al. (2003), McIntosh and Wydick (2005),
and Janvry et al. (2011).11
The papers closest to the present one are Navajas et al. (2003) and McIntosh and Wydick
(2005, henceforth MW), with both papers analyzing the interaction between a client-maximizing
incumbent MFI, and a prot-oriented entrant. MW show that increased competition can reduce the
MFIs' ability to cross-subsidize, so that poorer borrowers may be screened out. A similar eect may
arise in case increased MFI competition makes information sharing more dicult (in the presence
of asymmetric information regarding discounting). Navajas et al. (2003) nd that with increased
competition, the prot-oriented MFI may use screening to siphon o the more productive borrowers,
leaving the motivated MFI to supply the less productive borrowers, with negative implications for
these borrowers. Janvry et al. (2011) examine the implications in case credit bureaus are set up.
The present paper however diers from both MW and Navajas et al. (2003) in several respects.
First, borrower heterogeneity and the resultant possibility of cross-subsidization plays a critical
role in both these papers. In the present framework however, type specic contracts with cross-
subsidization are not possible. Second, while both MW and Navajas et al. (2003) allow for client-
maximization, they do not allow for motivated MFIs, with the borrowers' utility entering the
objective function of the MFIs directly. It may perhaps be argued that depending on the context,
either client-maximizing, or motivated MFIs, may be of interest. Next, unlike in MW, we generate
11In the context of NGO competition, Aldashev and Verdier (2010) examine a model where the NGOs allocate
their time between working on the project and fund-raising. They nd that if the market size is xed and there is
free entry of NGOs, then the equilibrium number of NGOs can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal one.
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multiple-lending in a static framework and do not introduce the possibility of repeat loans. Next,
in MW, the negative eect of MFI competition in the presence of multiple lending is driven by
the fact that such competition may worsen information sharing among the MFIs. In contrast, in
our model it is driven by the fact that increased competition may reduce transaction costs, thus
identifying a new channel through which the negative eect may operate. Finally, double-dipping
is not the focus in either Navajas et al. (2003), or Janvry et al. (2011).
Ho and Stiglitz (1987), Kranton and Swamy (1999) and Van Tassel (2002) also examine the
issue of lender competition, though for lenders in general, rather than MFIs in particular. Both
Ho and Stiglitz (1997) and Kranton and Swamy (1999) argue that competition may have negative
implications. While in Ho and Stiglitz (1997) the result arises out of the fact that in a monopolis-
tically competitive market, entry by new lenders leads to a loss of economies of scale (among other
reasons), in Kranton and Swamy (1999) it stems from the fact that competitive lenders cannot
aord to roll over loans as they are not assured of repeat relationships with the same borrowers.
Van Tassel (2002) develops a model where the threat of future entry may provoke the incumbent
lender to dilute the quality of information available to its competitors by charging a low interest
rate.
In contrast to the preceding papers however, the present paper not only explicitly grapples with
the issue of double-dipping but, moreover, allows for motivated MFIs. Also, while these papers
also generate negative implications for MFI competition, the channels identied in these papers are
dierent from those in the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the basic framework.
Sections 3 and 4, analyze SDE and DDE respectively. Section 5 analyzes the implications of an
increase in MFI competition, while Section 6 concludes. Finally, some of the proofs have been
collected together in the Appendix.
2 Framework
We frame the problem using a variation of the Salop circular city framework. The model is popu-
lated by borrowers of mass one, as well as several micro-nance institutions (MFIs). The borrowers
are uniformly distributed over a circle of unit circumference, whereas the MFIs, n in number,
are located symmetrically along the circumference of the circle. Let us denote these MFIs as
M1;M2;    ;Mn, and let these MFIs be located in the same order on the circle.
Every borrower has access to one productive project that requires a setup cost of 1, and yields
a return of F . She can also spend 1 unit of money on consumption, when she obtains a utility of
u. These two activities are however fundamentally dierent in that while production is ecient,
consumption is not, so that F > c0 > u, where c0 is the opportunity cost of capital. The MFIs
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however can access capital at a subsidized gross interest of c < c0.12 A borrower cannot undertake
more than one productive project.13
The borrowers however have no money, or assets, so that in case they want to invest, or consume,
they must borrow the required amount from some MFI. In case a borrower borrows one unit of
capital from an MFI located at a distance of xi from her, she also incurs a transportation cost of
txi. While the notion of transportation cost is compatible with a purely physical interpretation of
distance, one can interpret txi as a non-monetary transactions cost of borrowing for a borrower,
which captures the fact that the loan product oered by the lender may not be exactly tailored to
her needs. With this interpretation, an increase in the number of MFIs corresponds to an increase
in product variety. For convenience, though, we use the term \distance" through most of the
analysis.
We then impose a series of conditions so as to focus on the case of interest. We rst assume
that the productive project is ecient enough even after allowing for transportation costs, i.e.
F > c + t=4. Note that this ensures that even when there are exactly two MFIs (i.e. n=2), it is
ecient for all borrowers to take a loan for productive purposes (this is because doing so is ecient
even for those borrowers who are located the farthest from an MFI, and consequently have the
highest transaction costs of t=4). The project however is not too ecient relative to the cost of
capital, in the sense that F=2 < c. This ensures that double-dipping will lead to default. Further,
it also captures the ground reality that, for various reasons, productive projects may not be too
plentiful in less developed countries. Finally we assume that the subsidy received by the MFIs is
not too small, in the sense that u > c.14
A1. F   t=4; u > c > F=2.
Our second assumption is made purely to reduce the number of cases under consideration. It
states that the utility borrowers obtain from consumption should not be too small.15
A2. u > 2c  F=2:
The MFIs can observe whether the productive project is being undertaken or not. Whether the
borrowers consume or not is, however, unobservable. This moral hazard problem has important
12As MFIs target the poor - incurring targeting costs - and typically oer small loans, their costs of operation are
high relative to other lenders. This feature tends to increase the likelihood that MFIs are given subsidized access to
credit by the government. This is one aspect of our model that makes it more suited to analyzing MFIs, as opposed
to lenders in general (the other being allowing for lender motivation).
13This may, for example, happen if each project, in addition to a xed capital requirement, also requires en-
trepreneurial labor, so that one individual cannot run two or more projects at the same time, even if she obtained
the requisite capital.
14We shall later briey discuss the implications if subsidy is small, e.g. if c0 = c.
15However, this is not a serious restriction since if this assumption is relaxed, the only change would be that we
would have an additional sub-case to consider; none of our current results would be ruled out.
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implications for the borrowers' investment decisions. Thus if a borrower takes a single loan from a
MFI, then the concerned MFI can ensure that the borrower invests productively, and thus recover
its money. In case a borrower takes two loans, of 1 unit each, from two dierent MFIs, she can
however invest one unit in the productive project, but consume the other unit of capital. She can
do this by showing the same productive project to both the MFIs she borrows from. In that case
the MFIs may not be able to recover their capital. It is this moral hazard problem that lies at the
heart of the present paper.
Each MFI lends exactly one unit of capital to a borrower who approaches it. The transactional
costs of borrowing are not observable, so that the MFIs can only charge a uniform interest from all
borrowers who approach them. Let ri denote the uniform gross interest rate being charged by the
i-th MFI. Without loss of generality, let F  ri  c, for all i.
All MFIs maximize their utility subject to a break-even constraint. As discussed in the intro-
duction, we are interested in analyzing MFIs that are motivated, so that the utility of the i-th
MFI is a weighted sum of its prots, denoted by i(r1;    ; rn), and the aggregate utility of its own
borrowers, denoted by Wi(r1;    ; rn). Thus the utility of the i-th. MFI can be written as
Ui(r1;    ; rn) = Wi(r1;    ; rn) + (1  )i(r1;    ; rn); (1)
where 0    1 denotes the motivation level of the MFIs. Mi therefore maximizes (1) subject to
the constraint that i(r1;    ; rn)  0.
We consider a scenario where the MFIs simultaneously decide on their gross interest rates.
Given the conguration of interest rates, the borrowers then make their borrowing and invest-
ment/consumption decisions, with the MFIs giving out a loan of 1 unit of capital to all borrowers
that approach them.
While it may be argued that the moral hazard problem could be taken care of if MFIs shared
information regarding their client lists, in reality, however, MFIs do not appear to do so. McIntosh
et al. (2005) report, for example, that there is very little information sharing among the MFIs.
Moreover, in the context of our model, MFIs are unlikely to truthfully report their client lists as
they have an incentive to overstate their clientele so that other MFIs avoid these supposed \clients".
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game in pure strategies. Let U i(r1;    ; rn)
and i(r1;    ; rn) denote the utility and prot respectively of the i-th MFI, i.e. Mi, when the
interest vector is (r1;    ; rn) and the borrowers are responding optimally to the announced interest
rates, i.e. (r1;    ; rn).
Denition. We say that (r1;    ; rn) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if 8 i
(i) i(r1;    ; rn)  0, and
(ii) there is no r0i such that U i(r1;    ; r0i;    ; rn) > U i(r1;    ; ri;    ; rn) and i(r1;    ; r0i;    ; rn) 
0.
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A subgame perfect equilibrium is said to be a double-dipping equilibrium (i.e. DDE ) if at least
some of the borrowers take loans from multiple sources. We can dene a single-dipping equilibrium
(SDE for short) along similar lines.
Proposition 1. A symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists whenever MFI competition is not
too severe, i.e. n is not too large. Further, there can be multiple equilibria when the project is
reasonably protable, and the MFIs are neither too motivated, nor too prot-oriented.
The proof of this proposition follows from Propositions 2, 4 and 6 later on. However, when
MFI competition is very intense we nd that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. As we shall later
argue, in this case all borrowers will have an incentive to double-dip irrespective of the interest
rates, so that MFIs will necessarily make losses. Thus Proposition 1 implies that an equilibrium (in
pure strategies) exists whenever the MFI competition is not so strong that feasibility is destroyed.
3 Equilibria with Single-dipping
We begin by examining single-dipping equilibria, thus providing a benchmark for the subsequent
analysis. Further, this also allows us to examine, later on, the possibility of multiple equilibria,
as well as a regime switch from single-dipping to double-dipping equilibria. We nd that such
single-dipping equilibria exist whenever the projects are relatively productive, and the MFIs are
not too prot-oriented. Further we derive some comparative statics properties of such equilibria.
The argument proceeds in two stages. We begin by solving for the equilibrium rate of interest
in a symmetric SDE under the assumption that the MFIs make non-negative prots, and that there
is no double-dipping in equilibrium. This follows, as usual, from the utility maximizing conditions
for the MFIs. The complete solution is then obtained by incorporating these two criteria into the
analysis.
Consider a candidate symmetric single-dipping equilibrium where every borrower takes a single
loan, and all rms charge the same interest rate, say r. Under single-dipping, recall that the MFIs
can ensure that the productive project is undertaken, so that there is no default. Thus the utility
of a borrower who takes a single loan from an MFI located at a distance x from her is
F   r   tx: (2)
In an eort to pin down r, we proceed by examining if one of the MFIs, sayM1, has an incentive
to deviate to a dierent interest factor, say r0. We rst solve for the demand for loans facing the
deviant MFI. Such a deviation will aect the borrowing decisions of the borrowers located on both
sides of M1, i.e. those in between M1 and Mn, as well as M1 and M2. As usual, solving for the
demand facing M1 involves identifying the borrower who is indierent between borrowing from M1
and M2. Let us consider the borrower who is located at a distance of d from M1 and is indierent
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between borrowing from M1 and M2 (see Figure 1). Using (2) we nd that
d =
r   r0
2t
+
1
2n
: (3)
Thus M1's utility
U1(r
0; r;    ; r) = 2[fr   r
0
2t
+
1
2n
g(F   r0)  t
Z d
0
xdx] + 2(1  )[r   r
0
2t
+
1
2n
](r0   c): (4)
As usual the unconstrained solution, ignoring feasibility and the possibility of double-dipping,
follows from setting r0 = r in the rst order condition. Denoting the solution by r, we nd that
the rst order condition yields a unique solution with
r =
(1  )c  F   (3 2)t2n
1  2 : (5)
For r to qualify as the equilibrium gross interest rate, recall however that it must be the case
that (a) none of the borrowers have an incentive to double-dip, and (b) the MFIs break even.
First consider the incentive to double-dip. Given that money is fungible, a borrower who takes
a loan from two MFIs can spend on both the productive project, as well as consumption. She can
then show the productive project to both the MFIs, claiming that she has taken only a single loan
from that particular MFI. Given that r  c  F=2, the MFIs cannot of course both be repaid out
of the project income. We assume that in that case the two MFIs will share the project return
symmetrically, obtaining F=2 each. Clearly, the borrower's utility in this case is:
u  t=n: (6)
This is because in this case the whole of the return F from the productive project is taken away
by the MFIs, so that the borrower is only left with her consumption utility net of transaction
costs. Further, the total transaction costs of borrowing from two lenders is constant at t=n and
independent of the borrower's location.
To rule out double dipping, the utility from doing so must be less than the utility of a borrower
who takes a single loan from an MFI located at a distance x from her, i.e. F   r   tx.
From (2), it is enough to consider a borrower located at a distance of 12n from both M1 and M2
since such a borrower has the greatest incentive for double-dipping. (Other borrowers would be
closer to one MFI than to another, and hence be more tempted to borrow just from the closest one).
Given that the utility of such a borrower in case she does not double-dip is (1 )(F c)+(5 3)t=2n1 2 ;
there is no double-dipping provided
(1  )(F   c) + (5  3)t=2n
1  2  u  t=n; (7)
which simplies to
  ^ = u  (F   c  t=2n)
2u  (F   c  t=2n) <
1
2
: (8)
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Intuitively, if the MFIs are very motivated, so that  is large, then r would be small. This is
because a higher interest rate reduces borrower welfare, which is unappealing to a motivated MFI.
A low interest however makes double-dipping unattractive for the borrowers, hence the requirement
that   ^.
We next turn to the break-even constraint. We nd that there is some 0, 0 < 0 < 1=2, such
that whenever  < 0, the MFIs obtain a positive prot in case they all charge r. The intuition
again follows from the fact that, for  small, r is large, so that MFIs make a positive prot charging
r. Otherwise, for   0, they all charge exactly c, and break even.
Moreover, we can show that an SDE exists if and only if the project is relatively productive,
i.e. F > u + c   t=2n. This is because for F small, not only is the return from the project low,
but moreover, r is large, so that taking a single loan is not very attractive to the borrowers.
Formally, an SDE exists if and only if 0 > ^ (so that the range where MFIs earn positive prots
is non-empty), which simplies to F > u+ c  t=2n.
Summarizing the preceding discussion we obtain Proposition 2 (the detailed proof can be found
in the Appendix). The parameter zone for which an SDE exists is graphically shown in Figure 3.
Proposition 2. A symmetric equilibrium with single-dipping exists if and only if the project is
productive enough, i.e. F > c + u   t=2n; and the MFIs are not too prot-oriented, i.e.   ^.
Under these conditions we nd that:
(i) This equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric SDE.
(ii) Whenever the MFIs are neither too motivated, nor too prot-oriented, i.e. ^   < 0, then
the equilibrium involves all the MFIs charging an interest factor of r = (1 )c F 
(3 2)t
2n
1 2 ,
and earning positive prots. If the MFIs are extremely motivated, i.e.   0, then the
equilibrium involves all MFIs charging c and just breaking even.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that for an SDE to exist it is necessary that F be large, i.e. F >
u+ c  t=2n and  be not too small. The intuition follows from the utility function of a borrower
who takes a single loan. Her net utility depends on the gross return from the productive project
minus the interest factor and the transportation cost. F large not only has a direct positive eect
on her utility, but also an indirect one one via the interest rate, which is lower for higher values of
F . This ensures that double-dipping, wherein her utility comes from consumption alone and is not
aected by the interest rate, is not that attractive. Finally, a relatively large  ensures that the
interest rate is not too large, again making single-dipping relatively attractive for the borrowers.
3.1 Comparative Statics
We then examine the eects of changes in MFI competition level, as well as MFI motivation, on
the interest rate and borrower welfare under an SDE.
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Proposition 3. Let F > u + c   t=2n and   ^, so that a symmetric single-dipping equilibrium
exists. Further let  < 0, so that the equilibrium interest is r. Then:
(i) An increase in MFI competition leads to a decrease in the interest factor. An increase in MFI
motivation leads to a decrease in interest rates, as well as increases borrower welfare.
(ii) For  small, the equilibrium interest rate r is decreasing in F .
The intuition for Proposition 3(i) is quite straightforward. With an increase in the number of
MFIs, an increase in competition forces a lowering of interest, which is welfare enhancing. The
eect on welfare is ambiguous though. This is because while there is a reduction in borrowers'
transactions costs, which would have a positive implications for most borrowers, some borrowers
may be adversely aected if the new loan mix is not to their liking. Similarly, as the MFIs become
more motivated, charging a higher interest rate becomes less appealing to the MFIs, as this will
lead to a lowering of borrower welfare. Thus the equilibrium interest rate is lower, leading to greater
utility for the borrowers.
Proposition 3(ii) can be traced back to the utility function of the MFIs, i.e. (4). From (4) we
see that the marginal utility of r0 is decreasing in F , so that an increase in F implies that the MFIs
have an incentive to decrease their own rate of interest.16 Further note that this result is only true
for motivated MFIs, and not if  = 0.
4 Equilibria with Double-dipping
We next turn to analyzing equilibria with double-dipping. We show that an equilibrium with
double-dipping exists whenever either the project is not too protable, or it is protable and the
MFIs are not too motivated. Moreover, such an equilibrium exhibits some interesting properties.
As in the case of single-dipping equilibria, we proceed by rst solving for the equilibrium interest
rate under the assumption that the MFIs make a non-negative prot, and that double-dipping does
happen in equilibrium. We next examine what are the implications once these considerations are
allowed for.
Consider a candidate symmetric double-dipping equilibria where every MFI charges the same
interest factor, say r, and at least some borrowers take two loans, one each from the two MFIs
located closest to them. As earlier, we then examine if one of the MFIs, say M1, has an incentive
to deviate to a dierent interest factor, say r0.
Consider borrowers located in between M1 and M2. The utility of a double-dipping borrower
is given by (6), i.e. u   t=n. Next recall that in case a borrower takes a single loan from a MFI
16This follows as
@2U1
@r0@F
< 0:
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located at a distance xi from her, her utility is F   r   txi. Consequently in an equilibrium with
double-dipping, it is intuitive that borrowers who are close to M1 (respectively M2) will take a
single loan from M1 (respectively M2), whereas borrowers who are at an intermediate distance
from both the MFIs will indulge in double-dipping. In terms of the product variety interpretation,
the borrowers who double dip are those whose loan requirements do not correspond too closely with
the loan varieties oered by the MFIs whose products are \closest" to their loan requirements.
The total demand for loans facing M1 consists of two elements, that from those who single-dip,
and that from double-dippers. We then identify two borrowers, A and B, located in between M1
andM2, and at distances a and b respectively fromM1 (see Figure 2). Let A be indierent between
borrowing from M1 alone, and borrowing from both M1 and M2. Similarly, let B be indierent
between borrowing from M2 alone, and both the MFIs. It is clear that the total demand for loans
for M1 is 2a from single dipping borrowers, and that from double-dipping borrowers is 2(b  a).
Equating the payos from single-dipping and double-dipping (using (2) and (8)), it is straight-
forward to see that
a =
F   u  r0
t
+
1
n
; (9)
and; b =
u  F + r
t
: (10)
Thus, the `number' of borrowers in between any 2 MFIs who are double-dipping is given by
b  a = 2u  2F + r + r
0
t
  1
n
: (11)
Consequently the prot of M1, the deviating MFI, is
1(r
0; r) = 2[ar0 + (b  a)F=2  bc]; (12)
and the aggregate utility of its clientele is given by
W1(r
0; r) = 2[a(F   r0)  t
Z a
0
xdx] + 2(b  a)(u  t=n); (13)
where the term in square brackets denote the aggregate utility of those borrowers who take a
single loan from M1, and the second term represents the aggregate utility of those borrowers who
double-dip. Substituting these expressions into (1), we have
U1(r
0; r) = 2[a(F   r0)  t
Z a
0
xdx+ (b  a)(u  t=n)] + 2(1  )[ar0 + (b  a)F=2  bc]: (14)
Consequently, M1 maximizes its utility U1(r
0; r) subject to the break even condition
1(r
0; r) = 2[ar0 + (b  a)F=2  bc]  0: (15)
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We observe that the rst order condition for an equilibrium only depends on r0. Denoting the
solution by r, we nd that
r =
(2  1)(u  t=n) + (3  5)F=2
2  3 : (16)
We then incorporate the non-negative prot-constraint into the analysis. Using (9)-(11), we
nd that all MFIs charging r yields a non-negative prot if    (where  < 1=2), but not oth-
erwise. As in the case of single-dipping equilibrium, the intuition is that as the MFIs become more
motivated, charging a higher interest becomes less and less appealing, as this decreases borrower
welfare.
We then examine if the equilibrium indeed involves double-dipping.We rst focus on relatively
prot-oriented MFIs. We nd that whenever the MFIs are not very motivated, i.e.  is small, there
will be double-dipping with all MFIs charging r. This is because if  is small, then r is going to
be high, making double-dipping more attractive. We nd that this result obtains either when (a)
the project is not very productive, i.e. F < u+ c  t=2n, and   , or (b) the project is relatively
productive, i.e. F > u+ c  t=2n, and   ~, where ~ = u F=2u F=2+t=2n < .
Consider case (a). Project productivity, i.e. F , being small, has a negative eect on the utility
of a single-dipping borrower. While F being small also tends to make r smaller, thus mitigating
the direct eect of F being small to some extent, it is the direct eect of a change in F that
dominates. In case (b), F being large of course makes double-dipping less attractive, thus in this
case the MFIs have to be more prot-oriented for a DDE to be sustainable (this is captured by the
fact that ~ < ).
On the other hand, if the MFIs are relatively motivated, i.e.  > , then we nd that for F
small, i.e. F < u+ c  t=2n, the equilibrium involves all MFIs charging r such that they just break
even.17 With MFIs being very motivated they would prefer to charge low interest so that borrower
welfare is high. Thus in equilibrium they charge the lowest possible interest that is consistent with
feasibility.
We need one more notation before we can present the main result for this section. Let ~n be the
highest possible n such that MFIs remain viable at that level of competition (that is, they make
non-negative prots). We can show that ~n < t(u+c F )
2(u+c F )2 (u c)2 (this is proved in the appendix. The
parameter zone for which a DDE exists is graphically shown in Figure 3).
Proposition 4. Suppose that the number of MFIs is not so large that MFIs necessarily make losses,
i.e. n  ~n. A symmetric equilibrium with double-dipping exists whenever either (a) the project is
not too protable, i.e. F < u+ c  t=2n, or (b) the project is protable, i.e. F > u+ c  t=2n, and
the MFIs are not too motivated, i.e.   ~ = u F=2u F=2+t=2n . In case either of these conditions hold
then:
17The formal argument leading to this paragraph is provided in Observations 6-8 in the Appendix.
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(i) This equilibrium is unique in the class of DDE.
(ii) Suppose the project is not too protable, i.e. F < u+ c  t=2n. In case the MFIs are not too
motivated, i.e.  < , then all MFIs charge r() = (2 1)(u t=n)+(3 5)F=22 3 , when they earn
positive prots.18 Whereas if the MFIs are very motivated, i.e.   , then they charge r,
when they just break even.
(iii) Suppose the project is highly protable, i.e. F > u+ c  t=2n. If the MFIs are highly prot-
oriented, with   e = u F=2u F=2+t=2n , then a DDE exists with all MFIs charging r() and
earning strictly positive prots.
Proof. Given Observations 5-8 (in the appendix), for existence it is sucient to show that there
will be full market coverage. Note that the utility of a borrower who takes a single loan decreases
the farther she is from the concerned MFI. Moreover, the lowest utility enjoyed by such a borrower
equals u  t=n, which also equals the utility of all those borrowers who double-dip. Given that this
is positive, there is full market coverage.
We then observe that the rst order condition does not depend on the interest rate being
charged by the other MFIs. Consequently, all rms face the same optimization problem. Thus the
equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
The intuition has to do with the fact that a borrower's utility from double-dipping depends on
her consumption utility minus the transportation costs. This is attractive as long as the utility from
taking a single loan, which is positively related to F , is not too large. Thus for F small, double-
dipping would tend to be relatively attractive. Further, double-dipping can still be relatively
attractive for F large, if the MFIs are not too motivated since in this case the interest rate is going
to be high, making the option of taking a single loan relatively unattractive.
While the comparative statics properties of this equilibrium will be examined in greater details
in Section 5 later on, let us mention some interesting properties of this equilibrium.
First, consider the utility level of the borrowers located in between M1 and M2. For borrowers
who take a single loan, note that their utility decreases the farther they are from their lender,
say M1 (see (2)), whereas the utility of borrowers who double-dip is independent of location and
constant at u   t=n. Thus, for a borrower located at a distance of x from M1, the net dierence
in utility between single-dipping and double-dipping is decreasing in x. Thus borrowers closest
to M1 take a single loan, with their utility decreasing as x increases. For x large, double-dipping
becomes relatively attractive as the transactions costs of taking a single loan become too large,
relatively speaking. Consequently, the borrowers who double-dip are actually worse o compared
18In case competition is very high, but not so high as to make MFIs unviable, very prot-oriented MFIs charge r
in equilibrium, earning zero prots. We dene r in the appendix.To reduce the number of cases we focus on the case
where competition is not strong enough for this to happen.
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to borrowers who do not (see Figure 4). The intuition being that these borrowers double-dip
because given that they do not have loan products that suit their needs, single-dipping is not very
attractive and they are forced to double-dip.
Second, given Propositions 2 and 4, we can now prove Proposition 1. From Proposition 2 an
SDE exists if and only if the project is productive enough, i.e. F > c + u   t=2n; and the MFIs
are not too prot-oriented, i.e.   ^. Next consider Proposition 4. Given that n  ~n, existence
of a DDE is assured whenever either (a) the project is not too protable, i.e. F < u + c   t=2n,
or (b) the project is protable, i.e. F > u + c   t=2n, and the MFIs are not too motivated, i.e.
  ~ = u F=2u F=2+t=2n . Combining the two, we obtain the rst part of Proposition 1. The second
part of the proposition also follows from Propositions 2 and 4 (as well as Proposition 6 (to follow)).
Third, in case the MFIs are very motivated, i.e.  > , the interest rate - which is set at the
break-even interest rate r - may be decreasing in F at relatively high levels of r (and increasing at
low levels). Intuitively, an increase in project productivity increases the number of single-dipping
borrowers (by making investment and borrowing from a single source more attractive). On one
hand, this implies that the mass of single-dippers can be kept constant through a corresponding
rise in the interest rate. On the other hand, a higher mass of single-dippers means that the MFIs
can break even by charging a lower interest rate than before. The second factor dominates at high
levels of r, since at high rates of interest the marginal utility gain from a further increase in interest
is small.
Finally, note that the equilibrium interest r does not depend on the MFI's cost of capital, i.e.
c. This is because c enters an individual MFI's objective function only via its impact on aggregate
costs, which in turn depends on the aggregate number of borrowers who take loans from this MFI,
i.e. 2b. The result now follows as 2b only depends on the interest rate of the neighboring MFIs,
but not on the MFI's own interest rate. As we later argue in the concluding section, this result has
some policy implications.
4.1 Increase in Motivation
We now consider the eects of an increase in the motivation parameter, i.e. , on default. A priori
the eect is unclear. On the one hand, it may be argued that more motivated MFIs will charge
a lower interest rate, thus lowering default. On the other hand, however, it may be argued that
more motivated MFIs will be more tolerant of default, and thus increased motivation may lead to
increased default. This argument would be in line with Roy and Roy Chowdhury (2009).
Our analysis suggests that an increase in the motivation parameter necessarily reduces default.
The reason is somewhat deeper than what is usually argued though. In a double-dipping equilibrium
the double-dippers actually obtain a utility lower than those who do not double-dip. Thus the MFIs,
being motivated, in fact have an incentive to reduce double-dipping. The result then follows because
the way to do that is to reduce the rate of interest thus reducing the incentive to double-dip.
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Proposition 5. Let there be a double-dipping equilibrium. If  < , then for a small increase
in the motivation of the MFIs there is a decrease in the rate of interest, as well as the extent of
default. Further, there is an improvement in borrower welfare.
This is interesting given that in the Indian context some commentators have been concerned
about mission-drift, i.e. the MFIs becoming more prot oriented, which can happen either because
of the incumbent MFIs losing motivation, or due to the entry of new, more prot-oriented MFIs.
The Malegam Committee Report (page 33) states \it has been suggested that the entry of pri-
vate equity in the micronance sector has resulted in a demand for higher prots by MFIs with
consequent high interest rates and the emergence of some of the areas of concern which have been
discussed earlier." Thus Proposition 5 does seem to suggest that, in case of mission drift, such an
increase in interest rates, and consequently, default may take place.
4.2 Multiple Equilibria
Given Propositions 2 and 4, we can show that multiple equilibria exist (for some parameter val-
ues). This is not only of theoretical importance, but has implications for the eect of increased
competition. We shall later argue that this allows for the possibility of regime switch from an SDE
to a DDE as a result of an increase in MFI competition.
Proposition 6. Let the productive project be relatively productive so that F > u + c   t=2n, and
the MFIs be neither too motivated, nor too prot-oriented, i.e. ^    ~. Then there are multiple
equilibria, one SDE, and one DDE. Further, for any given set of parameter values, the interest rate
under the DDE exceeds that under the SDE.
Consider the parameter values for which multiplicity may obtain. Given that  is not too large,
r is going to be large, so that single-dipping is not that attractive for borrowers. Hence a DDE
exists. Whereas given that F is large and  is not too small, r is going to be small, so that
single-dipping is quite attractive, and an SDE exists.
Intuitively, the fact that the interest rate under a DDE exceeds that under an SDE can be traced
to the fact that under a double-dipping equilibrium the MFIs suer losses on some borrowers. Thus
they must charge a relatively high rate of interest so as to ensure that the prot component of their
utility is not too low. In a DDE, at least the borrower at a distance of 1=2n from M1 must have
an incentive to double dip (otherwise, there will be no double dipping). Hence this borrower must
get more out of double dipping than single dipping, i.e. we must have u   t=n > F   r   t=2n
or r > F   u + t=2n. Now consider the SDE. In an SDE, no one double dips, hence even the
borrower at a distance 1=2n from M1 (whose incentive to double dip is strongest) must obtain
more from single-dipping than double-dipping. This implies that F   r   t=2n > u   t=n, or
r < F   u+ t=2n < r.
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Example. As an example, consider F=20, c=11, u=12, t=36. Then for n < 6, F > u+c  t=2n.
Now we can show that both an SDE and a DDE exist for n=5. In this case we have ^=0.3548
and ~=0.3571, so that multiple equilibria obtains for  2 [0:3548; 0:3571]. Interest rate in the SDE
falls from 11.6 at  = ^, to 11.452 at  = ~. As expected, interest rates in the SDE fall with
motivation, though note that positive prots are earned over the entire zone. Interest rates in the
DDE over this zone fall from 11.614 for  = ^, to 11.6 at  = ~ (again, corresponding to a positive
prot). We nd that multiple equilibria are more likely to exist when n is not too low (subject to
still being in the zone such that F > u+ c  t=2n).
5 MFI competition: Default, interest rates and borrower welfare
We then turn to analyzing the eect of an increase in MFI competition. As discussed in the
introduction, this is an issue that has become extremely important in recent years and, consequently,
much debated in the literature.
We rst consider the eect of increased MFI competition on a double-dipping equilibrium,
abstracting, for the moment, from the issue of regime switch. We nd some interesting results. First,
we show that contrary to popular wisdom, default increases with competition. This is true both
of aggregate default, as well as of default per MFI. Consequently, an increase in MFI competition
necessarily leads to an increase in ineciency. Second, we nd that the eect on the interest rate
can go either way. Somewhat paradoxically, we nd that an increase in MFI competition leads to
an increase in equilibrium interest rates if the MFIs are highly motivated, whereas if the MFIs are
relatively prot-oriented, then an increase in their number induces a drop in interest rates. Finally,
the eect on borrower welfare is also not straightforward. While all borrowers gain from a decline
in interest rates, the eect of an increase in interest rates can aect dierent borrowers dierently.
While the utility of double-dipping borrowers increases, that of single-dipping borrowers may either
increase, or decrease.
Proposition 7. Let the hypotheses of Proposition 4 hold, so that an equilibrium with double dipping
exists. Consider the eect of increased MFI competition on equilibria with double-dipping:
(i) There is an increase in aggregate default, as well as the number of defaulters per MFI. Con-
sequently, ineciency increases.
(ii) Suppose that either (a) the project is not too protable, i.e. F < u+ c  t=2n and the MFIs
are not too motivated, i.e.   , or (b) the project is protable, i.e. F > u+ c  t=2n, and
the MFIs are not too motivated, i.e.   ~. Then an increase in the number of MFIs reduces
interest rates and increases aggregate borrower welfare.
(iii) In case the project is not too protable, i.e. F < u + c   t=2n and the MFIs are relatively
motivated, i.e.  > , an increase in the number of MFIs leads to an increase in interest
18
rates. While the aggregate utility of double-dipping borrowers increases, that of single-dipping
borrowers may either increase, or decrease.
In the Indian context, it is interesting that the recent Malegam committee report argues that it
is of the utmost import \to reduce interest rates charged by MFIs or improve the service provided
to borrowers....Ultimately, this can only be done through greater competition both within the
MFIs and without from other agencies operating in the micronance sector." (page 32, Malegam
Committee Report, 2011). As Proposition 7 suggests however, an increase in competition is not an
unmixed blessing as it necessarily reduces eciency, and may also adversely aect the borrowers'
utility.
Proposition 7(i) is intuitive. For example, consider the borrower who is located at the mid-point
between M1 and M2, and, for ease of exposition, suppose that she continues to be at the mid-point
even after there is an increase in the number of MFIs from, say, n to n0. With an increase in the
number of MFIs, double-dipping becomes more attractive compared to taking a single loan. This
follows since while the transactions cost under single-dipping falls from t=2n to t=2n0, that under
double-dipping falls at a faster rate, from t=n to t=n0. Ceteris paribus, this increases default. While
in some cases there may a countervailing eect in the form of a decrease in interest, it is the direct
eect which dominates.
Proposition 7(ii) deals with relatively prot-oriented MFIs. From Proposition 7(i), an increase
in MFI competition increases default, so that the MFIs reduce their interest rates in a bid to
decrease default. This, along with the fact that there is a decline in aggregate transaction costs,
imply that there is an increase in aggregate borrower welfare.
Proposition 7(iii) deals with relatively motivated MFIs. Interestingly, in this case an increase in
MFI competition may lead to an increase in the rate of interest, with adverse welfare implications
for at least some borrowers. Recall that in this case the MFIs just break even. When n increases,
double dipping becomes relatively more attractive, resulting in more losses and therefore requiring a
higher interest rate to break even. This however does not aect the double-dipping borrowers whose
utility increases because of the transaction cost eect, while for the single-dippers, the increase in
the interest rate and the reduction in transactions costs have opposite eects on utility.
Note that as in Ho and Stiglitz (1997), the present paper shows that an increase in lender
competition may push up interest rates. Unlike Ho and Stiglitz (1997) however, in this paper this
eect is a function of MFI motivation; if the MFIs are prot-oriented, this result will not obtain
and increased competition pushes interest rates down. Moreover, unlike in Van Tassel (2002), in
the present model, (a) the interest rate does not necessarily go down with increased competition,
and (b) if it does go down, it does not necessarily result in less default.
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5.1 MFI competition and regime switch
We then examine if an increase in MFI competition can cause a regime switch. We shall say that
a change in parameter values causes a regime switch from an SDE to a DDE provided initially
the equilibrium involved an SDE, whereas after the parametric shift there is a unique equilibrium
which is a DDE. A regime switch from a DDE to an SDE can be dened symmetrically.
We show that a regime switch from an SDE to a DDE may happen if the project is neither too
productive, nor too unproductive. Moreover, in that case interest rates can rise, and consequently,
borrower welfare can fall.
Proposition 8. Let there be an increase in MFI competition, so that the number of MFIs increases
from n to n0.
(i) Suppose that the project is neither too productive, nor too unproductive, in the sense that
u+ c  t=2n < F < u+ c  t=2n0. Then an increase in MFI competition can cause a regime
switch from an SDE to a DDE. In this case there can be an increase in interest rates, with
consequent decline in aggregate welfare.
(ii) Suppose the project is very productive in the sense that F > u+ c  t=2n0. Then an increase
in MFI competition can never cause a regime switch either from an SDE to a DDE, or from
a DDE to an SDE.
(iii) Suppose the project is very productive in the sense that F > u+ c  t=2n0. Then an increase
in MFI competition increases the size of the motivation levels over which multiple equilibria
obtain, i.e e  b.
Proposition 8(i) follows since, as argued earlier, an increase in MFI competition makes double-
dipping more attractive vis-a-vis taking a single loan. Why does this happen for intermediate values
of F? This is because for F large, the equilibrium interest rate is going to be low under a candidate
SDE, so that an SDE necessarily exists. Interest rates may increase as a result of the regime switch.
Example. Consider F = 50, c = 26; u = 30 and t=96. For n = 7, we have F > u + c   t=2n.
Further, ^ = 0:3; MFIs with this level of motivation charge an SDE interest rate of 26.857. Now
let n increase to 8 at which point there is a regime switch to a DDE. Keeping motivation constant
at 0:3, the interest rate in this DDE - with greater competition - has increased to 27:54.
Interestingly, both Propositions 7 and 8(i) show that an increase in MFI competition can lead
to an increase in equilibrium interest rates. However, while in Proposition 7 the result is driven
by the fact that the MFIs are breaking even in equilibrium, in Proposition 8(ii) it is driven by the
possibility of a regime switch. Interestingly though, both these eects can be traced to the fact
that an increase in MFI competition makes double-dipping relatively attractive.
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Propositions 8(iii) follows from the fact that with an increase in n, b falls, while e increases.
Recall that an increase in n leads to a fall in r; the interest rate charged in an SDE by MFIs
that are not too motivated. This factor makes single-dipping more attractive. It also reduces the
distance that a borrower who borrows from only one source has to travel (reduces the transaction
costs associated with single dipping). These factors then combine to reduce b, so that an SDE
becomes feasible at a relatively small level of motivation. At the same time, the rise in n increases
the tendency to default by reducing the distance a double-dipper has to travel (or alternatively, by
reducing the total transaction cost associated with double dipping). Hence a DDE becomes likely
even for relatively motivated MFIs (an increase in e).
Proposition 8(ii) then follows from 8(iii), since 8(iii) indicates that, subject to the fact that
the project is very productive, an increase in competition increases the interval of motivation over
which multiple equilibria obtain.
6 Conclusion
We conclude with a brief discussion of some policy issues. One main insight is that the eect of
policy changes may be nuanced because of the indirect eect of any such change on the level of
MFI competition.
6.1 Providing subsidized loans to MFIs
Policy-makers in India have argued in favor of a reduction in the MFIs' costs of lending, recom-
mending the provision of subsidized loans to MFIs to this end (see, Malegam Committee Report,
2011). In our framework, such subsidized loans to MFIs translate into a reduction in c. Interest-
ingly, in case the DDE involves a positive prot for the MFIs, such a fall in c does not aect the
interest rate, and hence default and borrower welfare. The only eect is an increase in MFI prots.
It is interesting that, even with motivated MFIs, the benets arising out of the provision of subsi-
dized credit need not be passed on to the borrowers. Of course, in case the MFIs are very highly
motivated, and the DDE involves the MFIs just breaking even, then the provision of subsidized
credit (leading to a fall in c) does lead to a fall in the equilibrium interest rate, which improves
borrower welfare. However, in case such a decrease in c attracts entry by more MFIs, then the
implications, as we have already argued, may be complex.19
19In contrast, if all subsidies on MFI loans were removed, so that c = c0 > u, our results would change in the
following way; when projects are relatively unproductive, a DDE would exist only for relatively prot-oriented MFIs,
which would earn positive prots (but not for very highly motivated MFIs). Other results would remain the same.
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6.2 A cap on interest charged by the MFIs
In response to increasing borrower defaults (notably in some Indian states like the Andhra Pradesh),
some Indian policy-makers are advocating a cap on the interest rates that MFIs are allowed to
charge (Malegam Committee Report, 2011).20 Their rationale for advocating such a cap is that
the poor may be unable to repay unless the interest rate is kept low. On the other hand, many
commentators disagree with this measure, fearing that such a cap may be too low to enable MFIs
to break even.21 What would a cap on interest rates mean in the context of our model?
We focus on DDE. Suppose that the interest cap, say r^, is lower than the existing interest rate.
In case the MFIs break even if they all charge r^, then it is easy to check that all MFIs charging r^
constitutes a DDE. In this case an interest cap unambiguously reduces the interest rate as well as
default, and consequently increases borrower welfare.
Things however are dierent in case the MFIs make losses at the interest cap. If we expand
the model by allowing for exit, then it is natural to conjecture that in equilibrium there will be
exit, and moreover, the equilibrium interest rate will involve all remaining rms charging r^. The
implications for borrower welfare are now unclear, because while a lower interest rate would tend
to increase welfare, welfare would tend to fall as there is a reduction in product variety.
In conclusion, we have constructed a tractable model of competition between motivated MFIs
where some borrowers may double dip and default in equilibrium, and analyzed the eect of compe-
tition on interest rates, default and borrower welfare. We obtain several interesting results. We nd
that while an increase in competition increases product variety, at the same time it increases the
incentive to double dip, and hence increases default. Moreover, while an increase in MFI competi-
tion leads to lower interest rates if the MFIs are relatively prot-oriented, competition can actually
raise interest rates for highly motivated MFIs. Further, for projects of intermediate productivity,
competition may induce a regime switch from a no-default equilibrium to one with double dipping,
possibly with an accompanying rise in interest rates and fall in borrower welfare. Our model also
shows that a no-default equilibrium is easier to sustain when borrowers have access to high produc-
tivity projects, all else equal; besides directly boosting the attractiveness of productive investment
relative to consumption, this also lowers interest rates, reducing incentives to default.
Acknowledgements: The second author is grateful for the PPRU grant 870-G, as well as
visitor-ships to the Singapore Management University and the National University of Singapore
that made this collaborative eort possible.
20The Committee advocates an interest cap of 24% on individual loans.
21See, for example, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/help-micronance-dont-kill-it/716105/0
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 follows from a series of observations, 1-4. We
rst state these observations, before providing the formal proofs later on. We begin by examining
the incentive for double-dipping.
Observation 1. There exists ^, where 0 < ^ < 1=2, such that whenever   ^ and all MFIs
charge r, then the borrowers have no incentive to double-dip. Further, in this case there is full
market coverage.
We then show that for an SDE to exist, it is necessary that the project be productive, i.e.
F > u+ c  t=2n.
Observation 2. A necessary condition for an SDE to exist is that u < F   c+ t=2n.
We then check if r exceeds c, which is necessary for the MFIs to break even. Straightforward
calculations yield
Observation 3. There exists 0 > 0, such that r  c if and only if   0. Further, given
u < F   c+ t=2n, ^ < 0.
Thus for any  in [^; 0], all MFIs charging r constitute an SDE.
Observation 4. For u < F  c+ t=2n and  > 0; there exists an SDE where all MFIs charge
c and just break even.
We next turn to proving these observations.
Proof of Observation 1. Note that from assumption A1, u > F   c   t=2n, 22 so that the no
deviation condition does not hold for  = 0. Thus an SDE cannot exist in case the MFIs are pure
prot maximizers. Then, there exists ^ > 0, such that the no deviation condition holds if and only
if   ^. We can check that the expression for ^ is
^ =
u  (F   c  t=2n)
2u  (F   c  t=2n) <
1
2
: (17)
Finally note that if the no-deviation condition holds, then this implies that the borrowers have an
utility of at least u  t=n > 0. Given that u  t=n > 0 (from A1), there is full market coverage.
Proof of Observation 2. Suppose we have u > F  c+t=2n. Rearranging, u t=n > F  c t=2n.
Now if the interest rate charged were c, this inequality implies that at least the borrower at a
22This follows since from A1, we have u > F=2.So we can write u > F   F=2 > F   c > F   c   t=2n, where the
second inequality follows as c > F=2.
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distance of 1=2n from both neighboring MFIs would prefer to double dip. However, note that to
avoid losses, MFIs in an SDE must charge an interest rate of at least c. If the inequality holds for
r = c it also holds when c is replaced by higher r. Hence, for all protable interest rates, a nonzero
mass of borrowers will double dip. Thus, for an SDE to exist, it is necessary that u < F   c+ t=2n.
Proof of Observation 3. We nd that there exists a threshold 0, such that r  c only for
  0. We observe that
0 =
t=n
F   c+ 3t=2n: (18)
One can show that given u < F   c+ t=2n, 0 > ^.
Proof of Observation 4. Step 1. First consider highly motivated MFIs, with  > 1=2: Now
note that for an individual MFI, setting r0 = r in the rst order condition, we obtain
t
@Ui
@r0
=  F + (1  )c  (3  2) t
2n
+ (2  1)r0: (19)
Now note that given  > 1=2; we have 2  1 > 0, so that the second derivative of utility with
respect to r0 is positive. Therefore, the rst order condition would minimize rather than maximize
utility. Moreover, recall that for a single-dipping equilibrium to exist, a borrower at a distance of
1=2n from M1 must get more utility out of single dipping, i.e. F   r0   t=2n, than out of double
dipping, i.e. u  t=n: This imposes a ceiling on r0: We must have
r0  F   u+ t=2n: (20)
From this ceiling, we may check that t@Ui@r0 < 0 for all feasible r
0. Hence, MFIs can maximize
their utility by setting the lowest interest rate consistent with non-negative prots, ie, r = r0 =
c:Moreover, no equilibrium where these MFIs set r = r0 > c exists ; given t@Ui@r0 < 0 for all feasible
r0; an individual MFI would deviate by charging a lower interest rate. Moreover, as long as r0 > c,
such a deviation would not violate the prot constraint.
Step 2. As shown in the text, for 0 <  < 1=2, r < c: We now show that whenever  2 (0; 1],
when all other MFIs are charging r = c, an individual MFI will not deviate by charging a dierent
r0. Evaluating t@Ui@r0 at r
0 = r = c, we get
t
@Ui
@r0
=  F + c  (3  2) t
2n
: (21)
Now note that the RHS of this expression is decreasing in , as its derivative with respect to 
is  (F   c)   3t=2n < 0 given c < F . Also, note from (21) that the RHS is equal to 0 at  = 0.
Therefore, for  2 (0; 1], we have t@Ui@r0 < 0 when this derivative is evaluated at r0 = r = c: If all
other MFIs are charging r = c, an individual MFI never wants to charge a higher interest rate.
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It may want to charge a lower interest rate; however, that would violate the non-negative prot
constraint and hence such a deviation would be infeasible.
Step 3. No symmetric equilibrium is possible for  2 (0; 1=2] where all MFIs charge r0 = r > c:
Suppose all MFIs were charging r0 = r > c. Then for an individual MFI,
t@Ui@r0 =  F +(1 )c  (3  2)t=2n  (1  2)r0 <  F +(1 )c  (3  2)t=2n  (1  2)c;
or
t
@Ui
@r0
<  F + c  (3  2) t
2n
< 0 (22)
as shown in Step 2. Therefore, an individual MFI has an incentive to deviate by lowering its interest
rate. As r0 > c, such a deviation does not violate the prot constraint. We have already shown in
Step 1 that charging r0 = r > c is also not an equilibrium for  > 1=2:
Step 4. The remaining condition needed for an SDE to exist for  2 (0; 1] at which the MFIs
symmetrically charge c and earn zero prots, is that even the farthest borrowers should not double
dip. This is equivalent to F   c   t=2n > u   t=n or F   c + t=2n > u. Thus subject to this
condition, the part of the proof which deals with relatively motivated MFIs is complete.
Step 5. Consider relatively prot-oriented MFIs, with   0: As argued in the text, these
MFIs maximize their utility by symmetrically charging r: Moreover, they earn positive prots by
doing so. However, all borrowers will refrain from double dipping if and only if   ^. Note that
given F=2 < u, we have F   c   t=2n < u which implies that ^ > 0: Moreover,it is evident from
Observations 2 and 3 that ^ < 0 whenever an SDE exists. Hence the interval [ ^; 0] is non-empty
and involves all MFIs symmetrically charging r and earning positive prots. Moreover, subject to
(7), the SDE automatically involves full market coverage.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider F   c + t=2n > u and  2 [b; 0] so that the MFIs are in an
SDE and charging r, where r is given by (5). Dierentiating r with respect to n,
dr
dn
=
t(3  2)
2n2(1  2) < 0; (23)
as  < 0 < 12 <
2
3 . Dierentiating r
 with respect to ,
dr
d
=
 (F   c  t=2n)
(1  22) < 0; (24)
as F > c + t=2n from A1. Thus a small increase in competition, or motivation, reduces interest
rates. As the utility of a borrower located at a distance x  12n from M1 in this SDE is given by
F   r   tx, and as F ,t and x are unchanged, the fall in r following a small rise in motivation or
competition therefore improves borrower welfare. The proof of part (ii) is in the text.
Derivation of ~n and Proof of Proposition 4 . That MFIs become unviable at large n can be seen
intuitively from the following. If n is larger than tu+c F , we have F   c > u  t=n. But this implies
that the utility a double-dipper gets, u  t=n, exceeds the maximum utility of even a single-dipping
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borrower located at a distance of zero from M1 (as such a borrower would incur no transport cost,
but would need to pay at least an interest rate of c). In this situation, every one would double dip,
so that MFIs would incur losses. Thus while ~n is necessarily less than this limit, we now derive a
tighter bound that ~n must satisfy.
We rst examine when the non-negative prot constraint is satised. Observe that the non-
negative prot constraint when all MFIs symmetrically charge r, reduces to
r2   Y r + Z  0; (25)
where Y = 2F   c  u+ t=n > 0 and Z =  (F   c)u+ F (F   c+ t=2n).23
Let r and r be the two roots of (25), with r being the minimal r that satises (25) with equality.
And moreover, let  satisfy24
r = r(); (26)
where it is easy to check that  < 1=2 (this is proved in Observation 5 below). MFIs make non-
negative prots as long as (25) is satised. We will prove below that if the interest rate that MFIs
optimally set (according to the rst-order conditions) lies in between r and r, they already make
positive prots. For MFIs for whom this is not the case, we will show that the interest rate they
end up charging corresponds to one of the two roots of (25). Hence, the condition that MFIs be
viable is tantamount to the requirement that these roots be well-dened. Now this is equivalent to
the requirement that Y 2   4Z  0. Substituting in for Y and Z and rearranging, we nd that this
can be written as
(u  c)2 >  t
2
n2
+
2t(u+ c  F )
n
: (27)
Given that n < tu+c F the RHS of (27) is increasing in n. Therefore (27) is likely to hold when
n is not too large. Dene ~n as the largest n for which (27) holds as an equality. Using n < tu+c F
and manipulating (27), we nd that ~n must satisfy ~n < t(u+c F )
2(u+c F )2 (u c)2 .
We then argue, that the break-even constraint is going to be satised at r whenever the MFIs
are not too motivated.
While the formal proof follows later, Figure 5 summarizes the basic argument. Note that
r2   Y r + Z is convex in r, with it being negatively sloped at r = 0. Thus there is an interval,
[r; r] over which it is negative. Given that r is decreasing in  and that r() = r, r  r for all
  . Given A2, and as long as n is not too large, so that (u  c)2  (c F=2)2 >  t2
n2
+ 2t(u+c F )n ,
we necessarily have r(0) < r. Consequently the upper limit implied by the non-negative prot
constraint never binds. If n is larger than the limit implied by the inequality above (call it n^)
but smaller than ~n, we have an additional sub-case where very prot-oriented MFIs charge r in
23Note that showing that Y > 0 as Y = F +F   c  (u  t=n) and it is easy to show that the term in curly brackets
in itself is positive given the restrictions on ~n.
24It is clear that r =
Y 
p
Y 2 4Z
2
: We shall later argue that both r and  are well dened.
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equilibrium, earning zero prots. To reduce the number of cases under study, we assume that
competition is suciently restricted that this case does not arise.
Observation 5. Let   and let n < n^. Then in the symmetric outcome where all MFIs
charge r, all MFIs have non-negative prots.
We then examine if the equilibrium indeed involves double-dipping. From (11) we see that
b   a depends positively on the interest rate. Therefore, if b   a is positive at r, then it is also
positive for r  r . Substituting r = r = r0 in (11), the condition for positive b  a boils down to
u > c+
p
Y 2   4Z, which simplies to
u > F   c+ t=2n: (28)
We thus have
Observation 6. Let   and u + c   t=2n > F . In case all MFIs charge r, then some
borrowers double-dip.
Combining the Observations 5 and 6, it is easy to see that provided competition is not too
strong, a double-dipping equilibrium exists whenever the MFIs are not too motivated, i.e.   
and the project is not too protable, i.e. u > F   c+ t=2n.
We then consider the case where the MFIs are very motivated, i.e.  > . Recall that for
 = , the MFIs just break-even at r. Consider any higher , and suppose that all MFIs apart
from Mi are charging r. In that case one can show that while Mi would like to charge a lower
interest factor, doing so leads to a negative prot. Thus charging r maximizes its utility subject to
the break-even constraint. Summarizing this discussion we have
Observation 7. Let  > , n < ~n and that all MFIs apart from Mi are charging r. Then, for
all r r, the utility of Mi is decreasing in r.
We nally show that if the project is relatively protable, in the sense that u < F   c+ t=2n,
then a DDE exists whenever the MFIs are not too motivated.
Observation 8. Suppose F > u+c  t2n and n < ~n. Then an equilibrium where some borrowers
double dip exists if MFIs are relatively prot-oriented, i.e. for  2 [0; e], where e = u F=2u F=2+t=2n < :
We then provide the proofs of Observations 5-8.
Proof of Observation 5. Step 1. Substituting for a, b and b   a (equations 9-11) into the
zero-prot constraint, we nd the latter can be expressed as a condition on a quadratic:
Q(r) = r2   Y r + Z < 0;
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where Y = 2F   c  u+ t=n > 0 and Z =  fF   cgu+ F (F   c+ t=2n). Observe that Y > 0, so
that Q(r) is decreasing at r = 0, and convex. Consequently, Q(r) < 0 holds for intermediate values
of r, r  r  r.
Step 2. Now it can be checked that dr

d =
u t=n F=2
(2 3)2 : The denominator is positive, and note
that the numerator is negative given u  t=n < F   c < F=2 where the last inequality follows from
c > F=2. Therefore, we have dr

d < 0:
Step 3. It can be checked that there is a threshold value of motivation  at which the lower limit
r imposed by the zero-prot constraint becomes binding. Moreover,  < 1=2: To see this, note that
rst, we must have r > c: Since some double dipping occurs, MFIs have to accept losses of c F=2
on a subset of borrowers, to counterbalance which the interest which they earn on non-defaulting
borrowers has to strictly exceed their cost. Now note that r(1=2) = F=2 < c so that losses are
made. Given dr

d < 0; we therefore infer that there exists a  < 1=2 at which r
() has just
fallen to r:Moreover,  is strictly positive as it can be checked that r(0) > r: Hence there is a
non-empty range  2 [0; ]:
Step 4: Finally A2 combined with n < n^ is sucient to show that MFIs charging r(0) make
strictly positive prots ; hence we must have r(0) < r; so that the upper limit of the zero-prot
constraint never binds ; pure prot-maximizers always earn a positive prot.
Proof of Observation 6. Unless a positive mass of borrowers are double-dipping, we cannot have
a double-dipping equilibrium. From Observation 1, for   ; we have r  r: From (11), b   a
is increasing in the interest rate charged. Hence if it is positive at r = r0 = r it is also positive for
r > r: Substituting in the expression for r in (11), we nd that the mass of defaulters evaluated
at r is b   a = u c 
p
Y 2 4Z
t : Noting that the denominator of this fraction is always positive; the
condition for positive b  a boils down to
u > c+
p
Y 2   4Z
Substituting in the values of Y and Z, and simplifying, this is equivalent to F   c+ t=2n < u. Note
that the condition does not depend on .
Proof of Observation 7. Consider relatively motivated MFIs with   . If all other competing
MFIs set their interest rate at r, will an individual MFI deviate by setting a higher or lower interest
rate? We split our analysis into two sub-cases.
Case 1 : 2=3 > .
First, note that for any MFI,
t
@Ui
@r0
= [2  1](u  t=n) + (3  5)F=2  (2  3)r0:
Thus @Ui@r0 > 0 for r
0 < r and @Ui@r0 < 0 for r
0 > r: Now recall that as r = r() and dr

d < 0, we
have r < r for  in this range. Thus the utility of the MFIs are decreasing in r0 at and beyond r.
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Now, check what happens to an individual MFI's incentives if r0 = r = r . In this range,
t@Ui@r0 < 0 so an individual MFI will never increase its interest rate beyond r. While it would like
to decrease its rate of interest, it cannot do so without violating the prot constraint. Hence no
deviation is possible if all MFIs charge r0 = r = r. Consider an alternative scenario where r0 = r >
r so that MFIs are earning positive prots. At any interest rate greater than r, utility is necessarily
decreasing in r0. An individual MFI can then increase its utility by deviating to a lower interest
rate than r. As r > r this would not violate the prot constraint. Hence, there is no symmetric
DDE in this range where MFIs earn positive prots, but there is one where they just break even.
Case 2.  > 2=3:
From examining the expression for t@Ui@r0 , we nd that for  > 2=3,
@Ui
@r0 < 0 for all feasible r
0,
recalling that for non-negative a, we must have r0  F  u+ t=n. The rest of the argument mimics
the earlier case.
Proof of Observation 8. Note that F > u+c t=2n implies, through rearrangement of terms, that
u < c+
p
Y 2   4Z, where recall that Y = 2F c u+t=n > 0 and Z =  fF cgu+F (F c+t=2n).
Consequently, it is impossible to have b a > 0 when the MFIs are relatively motivated (with   ).
Thus it is clear that when projects are very productive, no DDE exists for   . Now consider the
minimum interest rate above which some borrowers will always default. This is the interest rate
at which the inequality F   r   t=2n  u  t=n holds as an equality (so that the borrower who is
equidistant from M1 and M2 is just indierent between single-dipping and double-dipping). This
interest rate is therefore F   u+ t=2n: for higher interest rates, some borrowers will always double
dip and default. Moreover, as this threshold interest rate is clearly greater than r (given that no
one defaults at r) we may nd a critical level of  (call it e) such that r(e) = F  u+ t=2n. Using
the formula for r(), this works out to be e = u F=2u F=2+t=2n : Given that r() is decreasing in ,
we therefore nd that r  F  u+ t=2n for all  2 [0; e] so that for MFIs in this range, a positive
mass of borrowers is always double dipping. Moreover note that given u > F=2, e > 0. Moreover,
in this parameter range, e <  as at , the interest rate has already dropped to r < F   u+ t=2n.
As MFIs in the range [0; e] are already setting their interest rates through optimization, and as
r in this range satises the prot constraints, we therefore have an equilibrium with some double
dipping for MFIs in this range.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) From (16) recall that MFIs set their interest rate according to r
for  < . Now dierentiation yields
dr
d
=
u  t=n  F=2
(2  3)2 < 0:
The negative sign follows since F=2 = F   F=2 > F   c > u   t=n, given F=2 < c. Thus for
small  a rise in motivation causes a drop in the interest rate. Note that this proof - and the proof
of the subsequent parts of this proposition- applies equally to MFIs in a DDE in the zone where
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F > u+ c  t=2n.In this case MFIs have  < e <  < 1=2 and always charge r earning positive
prots.
(ii) From (11), the range of default, b  a, is decreasing in interest rates.
(iii) Let  < , so that the MFIs set r = r. Consider borrowers located in between M1 and
M2. As  increases, there is a fall in r
. Thus the number of borrowers who take a loan from
M1 alone increases, as a increases. Those who did so previously still continue to do so, and there
is a rise in their utility. This follows as the utility of such a borrower is denoted by F   r   tx
which is decreasing in r. The borrowers who switch from double-dipping to single-dipping also
experience an increase in their utility, as their utility rises strictly above u   t=n. The utility of
those who double-dip in both cases remains unaected.
Proof of Proposition 6. From Observation 8, when F   c + t2n > u, a DDE exists if MFIs
are relatively prot-oriented, ie, for  2 [0; e]. From Proposition 2,when F   c + t2n > u, an SDE
exists when MFIs are relatively motivated, with   ^. Combining these two results, we see that
multiple equilibria can exist when projects are relatively productive, i.e. when F   c+ t2n > u. The
second part of Proposition 6 (which deals with interest rates) is proved in the text.
Proof of Proposition 7(i).
Eect on default. Consider F < u+ c  t=2n and MFIs with  < . These MFIs set interest rates
according to r . From (12), we can substitute the solution for r into (6) to derive an expression
for b  a as a function of n:
b  a = 2[(1  )(u  F=2)  t=2n]
t(2  3) : (29)
Dierentiating with respect to n,
d(b  a)
dn
=

(2  3)n2 > 0; (30)
as  <  < 12 <
2
3 .
Therefore, the range of double dippers in between any two MFIs increases. Aggregate default
includes n such segments of double dippers. As each individual segment increases with a rise in
n, and as the rise in n also increases the number of such segments, aggregate default rises as
well.Note that this proof applies equally to relatively prot-oriented MFIs (with   e)in a DDE
in the zone where F > u + c   t=2n (of course, no DDE exists for more motivated MFIs in this
zone).These MFIs, too, charge r earning positive prots. To see directly that e < 1=2 in this
zone,note that F > u + c   t=2n is equivalent to F   c > u   t=2n. Now using c > F=2, we have
F=2 > F   c > u   t=2n or t=2n > u   F=2. Rearranging, we get e = u F=2u F=2+t=2n < 1=2: Hence,
the comparative static eects of a rise in n are identical. Now consider relatively motivated MFIs
in a DDE in the zone where projects are not too productive, ie F < u+ c  t=2n and  < . When
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   and hence when the interest rate is r; the expression for b  a is
b  a = u  c 
p
c2   2uc+ 2(F   c)t=n+ (u  t=n)2
t
(31)
(substituting for Y and Z). Dierentiation and simplication yields
d(b  a)
dn
=
F   c  (u  t=n)
n2
p
Y 2   4Z > 0:
The positive sign follows from the sign of the numerator, which we can show is always positive
given n < ~n . Therefore, we nd that b  a for highly motivated MFIs increases when n increases.
Therefore, an increase in competition for all MFIs increases the range of defaulting borrowers in
between any two MFIs, and also therefore increases aggregate default.
7(ii).
Eect on the interest factor and borrower welfare for prot-oriented MFIs. First consider the zone
where F < u + c   t=2n. Both r and r are functions of n. Hence the critical threshold  also
changes with a change in n. However, it can be shown that it will still be less than 1=2. First
consider what happens if the MFIs' motivation parameter is less than the (new) critical threshold,
so that they set interest rates according to r . Dierentiation yields
dr
dn
=
t(2  1)
n2(2  3) < 0; (32)
as  <  < 12 <
2
3 . Therefore, for MFIs with a relatively low degree of motivation, competition
reduces interest rates. This proof applies equally to MFIs in a DDE in the zone where F >
u + c   t=2n.In this case MFIs have  < e <  < 1=2 and always charge r earning positive
prots. Now consider the eect on borrower welfare for relatively prot-oriented MFIs, who set
their interest rates according to r. Now, the welfare of double-dipping borrowers increases to
u  t=n0 as the total cost of double dipping, t=n0, is now smaller. For the single-dipping borrowers
while their utility tends to increase both because interest falls and the transactions costs are lower,
some borrowers may be worse o as the MFIs may move away to a further location.
7(iii).
Eect on interest factor and borrower welfare for motivated MFIs. We are now dealing with rel-
atively motivated MFIs, with   . A DDE exists for these MFIs only in the zone where
F < u + c   t=2n, which is the zone we consider.It remains to check how r changes with n: Cal-
culations show that dr=dn has the same sign as 2r   F . However, we know that F=2 < r. Hence,
dr=dn > 0: For more motivated MFIs, an increase in competition raises interest rates.When MFIs
are relatively motivated, an increase in competition to n0 > n still increases the welfare of those
borrowers who were previously double dipping. However, borrowers who continue to single dip
may be worse o than before, as their utility falls due to a rise in the interest rate. They may
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however gain from the MFIs coming closer to them. Borrowers who switch from single-dipping to
double-dipping may or may not be better o than before.
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) When projects are at an intermediate level of productivity, so that
u+ c  t=2n0 > F > u + c  t=2n, it is easy to see that a small increase in competition from n to
n0 will cause a regime switch from a zone where - depending on the motivation level - either SDE,
DDE or both may be feasible, to a zone where only DDE is feasible.
(ii) Suppose F > u + c   t=2n0, i.e. projects are very productive, so that we do not transit to
the zone where only DDE is possible. However, as shown in the proof of Proposition 8(iii), the
increase in n widens the zone of motivation levels for which we have multiple equilibria.
(iii) The size of the multiple equilibria zone is given by max[e  b; 0]. Now we have
de
dn =
t
2n2
e
u F=2+t=2n > 0
db
dn =   t2n2 u[2u (F c t=2n)]2 < 0
Hence e  b is unambiguously increasing in n, the number of MFIs.
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Figure 1: Single-dipping equilibrium
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D: The borrower at D is indifferent between not taking a 
loan, and taking a loan from M1.
Figure 2: Double dipping equilibrium
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A: The borrower located at A is indifferent between taking a
loan from only M1 and taking loans from both M1 and M2.
B: The borrower located at B is indifferent between taking a 
loan from only M2 and taking loans from both M1 and M2.
Figure 3: Parameter zones for SDE, 
DDE and multiple equilibria
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Figure 4: Borrower Payoffs under 
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Figure 5: Proof of Proposition 4
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